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lt is quite eerie to read Anglophone economists discussing
monetarism as if it had not been vigorously debated
for more than a quarter of a century in Latin America,
and as if there had not been numerous attempts there
to apply monetarist doctrines starting, let us say, with
the Klein-Saks programme for Chile of 1957. One
feels one is seeing the re-run of an old film. Eminent
economists in Britain and the United States repeat
long familiar arguments (falling often into errors long
since overcome in Latin America). They cite empirical
evidence, for example the relation between the quantity
of money and prices, as if the world were bounded by
the North Sea, the Rio Grande del Norte and the coast
of California and British Colombia. The tacit assumptions
are that nothing of importance happens in foreign
parts and that, naturally, the native economists are of
no consequence.
For example, the Economic Journal of March 1981
carries papers and comments by four very well-known
Anglophone economists, originally presented at a
Royal Economic Society conference in July 1980, on
Monetarisman Appraisal'. These reveal almost total
ignorance of what has happened in other parts of the
world or been written elsewhere by monetarists (for
example, Kafka and Olivera in Latin America) or their
critics (eg Prebisch and Sunkel). There is no geographical
limitation in the title: 'Monetarism in the UK and the
USAan Appraisal', would have been at least not
incompatable with the exclusion of the rest of the
world. (Those reared in a true science such as
herpetology would be surprised if a conference on
Poisonous Snakes' concentrated exclusively on the
adder and the rattlesnake.)
In the main papers, David Laidler (who gives the
appearance of reviewing relevant published material)
and James Tobin cite between them more than 100
bibliographical references, of which (apart from the
North Holland Press and the OECD) all but one were
published in Britain, Canada or the USA, none at all
even in French, Italian or Spanish periodicals. There
is no mention of the documents of the IMF, the high
priests of monetarism.
Why did the Royal Economic Society not invite at
least one paper from an economist of a country with
long experience f monetarism? Why did neither of
the conference discussants, Robin Matthews and James
Meade, nor the Economic Journal referees, point out
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that both authors are clearly guilty of the gravest of
academic crimes: not knowing the literature! (These
authors are, of course, not alone in this: leading
Cambridge economists refer to each other's work
almost exclusively, indeed often only to their own
previous publications.)'
Anyone reading that symposium would believe the
crucial professional controversy in the world today to
be between the two wings of Anglophone neo-classicism,
Keynesian and monetarist economists. There is much
discussion of whether they have or have not drawn
closer together as a result of recent experience. This is
a discussion that seems agreeably chummy, but it must
give the impression (to those in the real world) of
being very much en famille: what the monetarists
have increasingly to worry about is structuralist not
Keynesian criticism, and they will continue to ignore
this at their peril.
There is an even more curious feature of much current
professional discussion in these parts, which is glaringly
exemplified by the symposium in the Economic Journal
A macro-economic policy is usually evaluated simply
by its impact on the country where it is adopted.
Effects on volumes and prices of imports, and the
balance of payments, are discussed as if there were no
foreign exchange problems in the outside world. It is
understandable that politicians and officials should
write in this way, but is it necessary to remind academic
economists that one country's imports are the exports
of another and that to ease one country's foreign
exchange deficit is to aggravate deficits elsewhere?
The charge that British monetarists have to face is not
the comparatively trivial one of causing the long
overdue retirement to a museum of some specimen of
industrial archaeology in Lancashire's textile mills, or
forcing a couple of million workers here to live off
unemployment benefits. It is that their policies have
played a large part in initiating a world slump of
catastrophic scale. Although the decline in activity in
the industrial countries is (so far at least) much shallower
than half a century ago, it has had a far more severe
impact in many other parts of the world, especially
Africa, because these are now more completely
integrated into the world economy. Tens of millions
A convenient starting point for Anglophone economists who want to
discuss the effects of monetarism and know no Spanish or Portuguese
would be Inflation and Growth: the Heart of the Controversy I eds.
Baer and Kerstenetzky. Irwin for Yale. 19641.
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who previously had been merely malnourished in
countries where there is no social security whatever,
have been reduced to near or actual starvation.
The charge can be detailed. Item, that British (and
later US) monetary policy did involve reducing imports
of raw materials and foodstuffs, contributing to declines
in their price and aggravating the already severe
foreign exchange problems of exporters of these
products. Item, that the reduction in the demand for
manufactures did contribute indirectly to the same
consequences by helping spread the recession through-
out the industrial countries, which have collectively
presented Africa, Asia and Latin America with the
payments deficit that is the counterpart of the OPEC
surplus of (recently) about S100 bn per annum. Item,
that the British and US Executive Directors did
encourage the IMF to scold not the governments of
industrial countries, as might seem only fair, but those
of the Third Worldand, moreover, upbraid them for
having courageously shouldered more than their share
of this deficit. Item, that the interest rates on the
consequent debt, because of monetary policy in the
industrial countries, did further aggravate the deficit
of the Third World. Item, that because many govern-
ments have had to go to the IMF for assistance in
meeting their deficits, they have had to adopt open
door development strategies and monetarist policies,
irrespective of social needs or economic structure.
Item, that neo-classical influences, originating overseas
and purveyed through many other channels academic
and official, did prepare the ground for such pressures.
Item, that these policies could only be put into effect
in many cases by military dictatorships, some of which
are harshly repressive.
This long charge sheet of the various ways monetarism
has affected developing countries is so serious that
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quibbling about the appropriateness of Keynesian
remedies for the author's local economy appears callous.
(Nero did at least produce some music while Rome
burned; not just debate what instrument he should use
and whether fine tuning' would enable him to play a
sweeter melody to his court.) There are in fact possible
lines of defenceand if monetarists have difficulty in
identifying them, the rest of us would no doubt be glad
to assist. But due recognition that, somehow or other,
a case has to be cobbled together would be welcome.
Those who read this Bulletin will be put in a position
to avoid such parochialism. Case studies of monetarist
policy are provided and an analysis of the influence of
the IMF. Indeed readers will be introduced to problems
that have not yet occurred to the main body of the
Anglophone profession, even about their own econo-
mies. For some years Latin American economists
have been faced by a paradox that emerges clearly
from several of these papers - putting it baldly, the co-
existence of monetarist policies and chronic inflation.
In the 17 years of monetarist aspirations since the
Brazilian coup; prices have risen more than a hundred
fold. What makes the paradox more striking is that the
explanation cannot lie in the trade unions, the favourite
whipping boys of Anglophone economics, because
these have been weakened if not destroyed as part of
strategies of economic liberalism. It is predictable that
later in the 1980s the same paradox will be discussed in
the EconomicJournaland once more as if there had
been zero experience or debate elsewhere.
Postscript. Since the above went to press, I learned
of Professor Tobin being awarded the Nobel Prize for
Economics. At such a time it would be churlish of me
not to say that, despite my criticism of a particular
paper, this well-merited award gives great pleasure to
all who know him and his writings.
